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Abstract 
The article critically reviews the book “Italian Constitutional 
Justice in Global Context”, analysing the extensive use of the case 
approach made in the text and examining the creative nature of 
the Italian constitutional Court. The essay underlines in particular 
the “style” adopted by the Italian Court, which, according to the 
authors, is characterised by a principle of relationality with other 
institutional actors: Courts, judges, policies, and citizens. 
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1. Introduction 
Italian constitutional law and its constitutional 
jurisprudence are not entirely unknown outside of Italy. It would 
therefore be an exaggeration to say that this book, addressed to 
non-Italian scholars, fills a knowledge gap. However, it is also true 
that, at the supranational level, there is only an occasional and 
sporadic perception of the Italian system, largely the result of 
dialogue between courts. So I feel that the specific contribution of 
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this text lies in the way it highlights the qualities of the overall 
model. The volume essentially provides a generally systematic 
overall view of the role of the Constitutional Court in Italy. It thus 
fosters a move away from the fragmented dialogue that has 
largely characterised the Court to a more open dialogue with the 
whole community of interpreters of law. This is a first significant 
element to be acknowledged with regard to this book.  
The volume provides an analysis of the Italian model 
bearing in mind the different systems and global contexts, in close 
- though sometimes implicit - dialogue with the experience of 
others. The Italian model emerges favourably from the 
comparison. 
The privileged yardstick is the US system, i.e., the oldest 
and most important constitutional justice on the planet, and he 
impression that emerges is very significant: despite their 
differences, comparison between constitutional justice systems 
provides useful insights, highlighting the shortcomings, but also 
the benefits, of their real life experiences.  
Before offering some more direct considerations on the 
content of the book, I would like to mention another of its strong 
points, perhaps an indirect, but nonetheless important one (even 
though I feel perhaps it is not one of the aims of the volume). In 
times of fragility and debate regarding the Italian constitutional 
system, in a period when the Italian constitutional system in 
general, and Italian constitutional justice in particular, are often at 
the forefront of controversy, a text of this kind shows its vitality, 
and in some way contributes, albeit indirectly, to the 
strengthening of the central role of constitutional justice and the 
constitutional system as a whole. 
Moving on to discuss the merits of the theses presented in 
the book, I would like to focus on three specific issues 
characterising this study addressed in the text. In particular, I look 
at a) the method used, b) the role of the courts within the system, 
and c) Italian style. 
At this point, I present my overall assessment, which is not 
so much of the book, as, generally speaking, the phase that the 
whole constitutional justice system is going through, and not just 
the Italian one. This is the guiding idea running through the 
considerations I am about to offer. 
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My personal belief is that national constitutional justice in 
the global context should find - or perhaps simply consolidate - an 
equilibrium that as yet does not exist. In this situation of 
permanent instability, the greatest risk is that of losing the most 
solid certainties of the national tradition and becoming 
overwhelmed by events that can rock the entire constitutional 
justice system, with unfavourable consequences. I aim to explain 
and justify my impression, considering the three points 
mentioned. 
 
 
2. The method 
The text makes extensive use of the case approach. With 
respect to our dogmatic and systematic tradition, this is certainly a 
quick move forward. I think this is in part dictated by the need for 
international comparison, as well as the influence that the case 
approach has on the international level. In part though, I think it is 
also the result of a particular sensitivity by the authors to a trend 
that is becoming more widespread and that sees the case approach 
gaining ground also in the Italian system of constitutional justice, 
often at the expense of dogmatics and, perhaps, also systematics. 
An example might clarify my point. We refer to the 
extended use, encouraged by the Italian Constitutional Court 
itself, of interpretation compliant with: compliant with the 
Constitution, compliant with the ECHR, compliant with EU 
regulations. This favours the spread of control over the 
constitutionality of laws (i.e., compliance with the ECHR or EU 
legislation), indirectly and informally placing specific limitations 
on interpretation by ordinary courts. Anyone wishing, however, 
to find unity in the system as a whole, must employ the case 
approach, having to examine each compliant interpretation by the 
different courts and then find - if there is one - a single fabric, a 
system, or dogmatics. The advantages of this perspective are 
obvious (basically: the spread and greater concreteness of the 
judgment on the constitutionality of the norms). It also brings with 
it some costs, however. Not so much the risk of losing the abstract 
character of a judgment or its centralised nature as that of the 
Constitutional Court losing its specific role as decision-maker of 
last resort, all the more so in a complex, global system where it 
seems that no one has the last word any longer, especially in a 
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peculiar order like the Italian one which does not envisage the 
doctrine of stare decisis. Basically, there is a risk that the system of 
constitutional jurisdiction will no longer have sole competence. 
Furthermore, this greater difficulty of finding unity in the 
constitutional system does not only depend on causes “internal” 
to the Italian domestic system or the specific techniques of 
interpretation adopted, but, also in more general terms, it is due to 
the overall process of gradual integration and interference among 
national and supranational courts. While hoping for greater 
dialogue between courts, there is also the risk of eclecticism and 
an excessive diversity of languages, and the impossibility of the 
unambiguous and reliable protection of fundamental rights. One 
could find numerous examples of different interpretations by both 
national and supranational courts, that, from a substantive 
standpoint, favour a very different range and protection of the 
same rights; safeguards that at times are at odds with each other. 
Suffice it to think of the significant case, whose oscillations are 
sometimes strongly marked by the principle of dignity: 
“Constitutional Metavalue”, made up of both domestic legislation 
and judge-made law, and that can be applied in very different 
ways. 
Thus, I think there is a need to seek a balance that has not 
yet been found. To do this, I wonder if today we should not be 
thinking about instruments which, alongside the inevitable use of 
the case approach, might stem any possible excessive eclecticism 
and diversity of languages, in order to avoid succumbing to the 
chaos of the opinions of Courts, including the authoritative ones 
of Supreme Courts. From this perspective, then, our dogmatic and 
systematic tradition might find renewed strength in a role where it 
could restore balance, reducing cases to reason. In this dogma-
centred effort, I believe that the national constitutional courts, and 
especially the Italian ones, can still play a decisive role, perhaps 
not becoming an “island of reason” - 1to borrow Franco 
Modugno’s famous phrase - but, at least, as a beacon indicating 
the route. 
 
 
                                       
1 F. Modugno, L’invalidità della legge. Teoria della Costituzione e parametro del 
giudizio costituzionale (1970). 
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3. The role of the Courts 
The creative nature of the Italian Constitutional Court, 
which participates in its own insertion within the system, emerges 
very clearly in this book. It is not a question of the total self-
determination of their role, but of a sort of co-determination of the 
Court and its judgments within the overall system of powers. 
Looking at a possible constitutional role partly established 
by the courts themselves from this perspective, the parallel drawn 
in one chapter of the book between the first judgment of the 
Italian Constitutional Court, i.e., no. 1 of 1956, and Marbury v. 
Madison2 is very significant. Moreover, the creative nature of the 
Constitutional Court or, more generally speaking, of “Supreme” 
Courts, must now be considered a universal given. Suffice it to 
recall the sensational case of the European Court that, in the 
absence of any explicit formal footing, at least until Maastricht, 
managed to establish a real system for the protection of 
fundamental human rights which was only later transposed, 
normalised, normatised, and perhaps expanded by the political 
and institutional system through the Charter of Nice. 
Speaking of the “imbalances” to be highlighted here, it 
seems to me that we run today the risk of excessive judicial 
creativity. I do not pose the question in the more usual terms of 
excessive judicial activism. Still less would I hope for a simple 
return to textualism, also because, ultimately, I do not think one 
can draw an immediate parallel between adherence to the text and 
the self-limitation of the judges of the Constitutional Courts in 
particular. Looking at the US experience, the late Justice Scalia 
showed that, behind the screen of original intent he always justified 
- often brilliantly - daring interpretations of the US Constitution 
which, however, did not always conform to the spirit of the time 
and whose rate of creativity cannot be said to be insignificant. 
The point I wish to raise, then, is another. It seems to me 
that an excess of creativity on the part of courts - and, in 
particular, Constitutional Courts - can sometimes be detrimental 
to the effectiveness and the very solidity of both the individual 
rulings and the rights they seek to protect. There is a real risk of 
                                       
2 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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undermining the rights to be guaranteed and, ultimately, of 
delegitimising the Constitutional Court itself. 
Also in this case I would like to recall only a couple of 
cases. They are quite well-known judgments. The first is the ruling 
on the jurisdictional dispute between State powers that 3solved a 
highly sensitive question, operating at the core of the form of 
government, formally and substantively endowing the Head of 
State alone with the power to pardon. It is not my intention to 
enter into the merits of the decision here. I shall merely make the 
following observation: the creative ratio decidendi by which the 
issue was solved did not prove able to sustain comparison with 
reality. The “solely humanitarian basis” that the Court identified 
to legitimise the presidential power to pardon proved, in fact to be 
absolutely unfounded. Suffice it to refer to the subsequent 
pardons granted to Colonel Joseph Romano and other CIA agents 
involved in the Abu Omar case - where no humanitarian grounds 
can be discerned, but only political and diplomatic ones - to see 
how the power of presidential pardon is bereft of any supporting 
foundation. It is the outcome of a creation with no concrete basis 
that has rendered indefinite and anonymous such a sensitive 
institution as presidential pardon. 
In this, as in other cases, one wonders how such a strong 
propensity for creativity on the part of the judges may be justified. 
I think the underlying reason lies in a radical political crisis that 
arises from an imbalance in the system and that ends up falling to 
the courts. We recall, and this is the second of the sentences I wish 
to refer to, the sentence of the Court on the electoral law4. Again - 
looking beyond the merits of the judgment - what else led to this 
decision if not the impotence or, perhaps, the arrogance of the 
political power, which proved unable to approve an electoral law 
despite three previous recommendations by the Court? This is 
what led the Constitutional Court itself to produce an electoral 
law compliant with the Constitution. This was not at all an 
obvious move; in fact until some time ago, it would have been 
unimaginable. It would never have been conceivable, in fact, that 
the most “political” of laws (the electoral law which establishes 
the basis of representation and is at the foundation of the very 
                                       
3 Judgment no. 200 of 2006. 
4 Judgment no. 1 of 2014. 
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legitimacy of representative democracy) could be created by the 
Constitutional Court instead of Parliament. 
Moreover, the judgment on the electoral law that led to 
such controversy cannot be considered an isolated event, nor is it a 
mere case for the books, nor yet is it due to any alleged 
hyperactivity on the part of the Italian Constitutional Court. It 
reflects a general political imbalance. Ultimately, it is down to the 
instability and the inability of politics to put in place the 
constitutionally necessary actions that explain so many other 
creative choices by judges (and not only in the Constitutional 
Courts). We need only think of another kind of case of particular 
relevance today that has produced a very large number of 
supplementing judgments produced in various ways due to the 
lack of regulation protecting the fundamental human rights of 
individuals concerning their sexual orientation. 
However, there is no denying that this imbalance, caused 
by political absence, has sometimes brought about an excess of 
judicial realism: an absolute pragmatism, with a tendency to self-
referentiality that I do not think can be considered a possible goal 
for the global systems of constitutional protection. I refer to those 
tendencies that induce courts to over-emphasise the role of the 
legal fact on a case-by-case basis (cf. the above-mentioned 
presidential pardon and electoral law). Also to the strong 
propensity shown by the Courts to respond more to a presumed 
natural law (the idea of justice) than to the actual text of the 
Constitution (secularised justice). Not without fault is the 
increasingly intense dialogue between the Courts, which 
sometimes appears to absorb, rather than be mediated by, the 
regulatory and political context, at home, in Europe or 
internationally. 
Each of the cases mentioned suffers from the effect of a lost 
balance. I see no other way to regain this balance than the return of 
politics to the Constitution, accompanied by the containment of 
the judiciary within the narrow scope of “negative creativity”, 
defined by strict compliance with the rules of legal interpretation 
and constitutional principles. 
 
 
4. The Italian Style 
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At this point, we come to the third and final topic that I 
wish to address. The last, pregnant, pages of the book are 
dedicated to Italian Style. The authors claim that this style is 
characterised by a principle of relationality with other actors: 
Courts, judges, policies, and citizens. I am unsure whether this 
may be interpreted as a way of seeking the lamented lost balance 
that we have mentioned here. But what I definitely want to 
remark is that this relationalilty (both “institutional” and 
“interpretative”) might perhaps be a goal to aim for, but it cannot 
be considered as a consolidated given within the Italian 
constitutional justice system in today’s context. 
Let us start with “institutional relationality”. There is no 
doubt that a great many virtuous changes can be attributed to the 
Italian Constitutional Court and its style. The Constitutional Court 
has often called on the other institutions - primarily Parliament - 
to adapt the political system and its norms to the Constitution. 
There have been countless advances related to this virtuous 
relationship, from the dismantling of Fascist legislation to that 
relating to family law. But it is also true that it is not always 
possible to discern any positive “relationality” actually pursued 
by the various institutions. The outcome of the rulings in 
legislation cannot always be said to be linear; indeed, it is 
sometimes non-existent. 
I would also like to emphasise another aspect in an attempt 
to show how and to what extent I feel “relationality” can, or must, 
operate. Sometimes relationality should not be understood as a 
fair effort to cooperate on the part of the Court with the other 
powers. When fundamental rights or supreme constitutional 
principles are at stake, it must be acknowledged that the Court 
operates “intransigently”. I think this should happen every time 
that, faced with a violation of supreme constitutional legality by a 
political majority, the counter-majority role of the Court has to be 
brought into play as a constitutional Court that asserts itself as an 
indefatigable guarantor of the Constitution and the rights of the 
individual against any majority temporarily in government. 
Clearly, this does not concern only relations with 
Parliament or the political majorities, but in all cases when the 
Court interacts with the other powers; including that of the 
judiciary. In this case too it can not be forgotten that the hoped for 
harmony is not always present. There have been not a few “wars 
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between the Courts”. A dose of conflict between different types of 
Courts is to be considered natural: there is always a crisis always 
lurking round the corner. So also in this case relationality must be 
understood as a goal to be pursued, and not a natural 
characteristic of Italian style.  
But perhaps the most sensitive point that the book raises 
concerns “interpretative relationality”, addressed in the closing 
pages. Different and competing methods of interpretation are 
presented in two parts of the book, be they originalist, teleological, 
related in varying degrees to the above, or the literal or systematic 
approach. At one point we read this sentence: “The constitutional 
court follows a comprehensive methodology, one that does not 
shy away from complexity5.” I wonder if this is an elegant way of 
exposing the abuse of eclecticism. What is certain is that in reading 
the case law of this Court, occasional excess can be observed: with 
slightly forced balancing acts, excessively abstract reasonableness, 
and artificially induced proportionality, it is doubtful whether a 
balance has really been achieved. My impression is that there is a 
lot of work to be done by both scholars and judges in the field of 
constitutional interpretation, while some of the canons used, such 
as reasonableness and proportionality, at times prove too elastic, 
far too elastic. In these cases, the Court tends to over-widen the 
margin necessary to achieve a constitutionally acceptable result, 
thus risking to venture too close in the direction of interpretative 
subjectivism. So, in addition to interpretive relationality it is 
necessary to exercise care in maintaining close relationality with 
the text of the Constitution. This too can be of help in finding that 
constitutional balance which as yet does not exist. 
                                       
5 V. Barsotti, P.G. Carozza, M. Cartabia & A. Simoncini, Italian Constitutional 
Justice in Global Context (2015) 238. 
